A Methodology for Safety Culture Index Assessment  Using Minimal Cut Sets by ���������
 Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management PSAM 12, June 2014, Honolulu, Hawaii 
A Methodology for Safety Culture Index Assessment  
Using Minimal Cut Sets 
 
Kiyoon Han, Yongjin Lee and Moosung Jae*  
Department of Nuclear Engineering, Hanyang University, Seoul, 133-791, Korea 
*
Corresponding author: jae@hanyang.ac.kr 
 
Abstract: The purpose of this study is to evaluate the Safety Culture Impact Index (SCII) for several 
types of nuclear power plants in Korea. The SCII model can be used for measuring the changes of the 
core damage frequency which might be affected by the status of safety culture in nuclear power plants. 
In order to develop the SCII model, the safety culture indicators and their assessing method are 
developed and applied to a reference plant. The reference plants are selected and their basic events are 
evaluated according to the level of the impact of safety culture. The results include the procedure to 
obtain the safety culture impact index as well as the frequencies of accident sequences which are 
expressed by the logical combination of minimal cut sets. The SAREX code is used for producing 
safety culture impact index related to the plant status. The correlation between the basic events caused 
by the quality of safety culture has been analyzed in this study. The uncertainty in safety culture 
impact has been also analyzed. The developed SCII model might contribute to comparing the level of 
the safety culture among nuclear power plants as well as to improving the management safety of 
nuclear power plants. 
 
Keywords: Safety Culture, Human Errors, Minimal Cut Sets, Risk, Impact Index, Nuclear Power 
Plants 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Safety culture is defined to be fundamental attitudes and behaviours of the plant staff which 
demonstrate that nuclear safety is the most important consideration in all activities conducted in 
nuclear power operation. Recently, the safety culture of nuclear power plant has been emphasized in 
reactor safety world-widely. Moreover, through several accidents of nuclear power plant including the 
Fukusima Daiichi in 2011 and Chernovyl accidents in 1986, the safety of nuclear power plant is 
emerging into a matter of interest. From the accident review report, it can be easily found out that 
safety culture is important and one of dominant contributors to accidents. It is also known that the 
enforcement of safety culture have an important role for improving the safety of nuclear power plant.  
The term “safety culture” was first introduced by International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group 
(INSAG) that consists of international experts to analysis and to prevent nuclear accidents. The safety 
culture was defined by the INSAG as "the assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations 
and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the 
attention warranted by their significance" [1]. The safety culture assessment has been usually 
conducted using the questionnaire and the interview which are such as ASCOT and SCART. These 
methods by the way have some disadvantage that the subjective judgment plays an important role in 
safety culture assessment. The various quantitative methods for assessing safety culture are suggested 
in several research papers to improve this disadvantage. One of the previous research works in these 
areas includes the work process analysis model which evaluates the impact of organizational factors 
on risk using Probabilistic Safety Assessment [2]. The success likelihood index method used in the 
human reliability analysis (HRA) is utilized in this WPAM method. When the success likelihood 
index method is also a subjective oriented method in which the probability of component failure and 
initiating frequencies might be non-systematic and overestimated. Therefore, the purpose of this study 
is to develop a new methodology that assesses quantitatively the safety culture impact index 
overcoming these disadvantages.  
   
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1. Definition of safety culture indicator 
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To achieve the main objective of this study, the methodology to produce the safety culture indicators 
are developed in the beginning. The safety culture indicators that show the status of safety culture in 
nuclear power plants are presented in various forms in the literatures [1]. INSAG-4, “Safety Culture” 
describes safety culture elements classifying in three categories: individual’s commitment, manager’s 
commitment, and policy level commitment. In addition, the safety culture indicators are explained to 
encourage self-examination in individuals and organizations [2]. Their indicators are provided as 
typically “yes / no” question format.  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations published “Principles of a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture” in 
2004. In this reference, the definitions of eight safety culture principles and their attributes to assess 
the level of safety culture are specified [3]. INPO another publication “Traits of a Healthy Nuclear 
Safety Culture” describes the essential traits and attributes of a healthy nuclear safety culture. The 
traits described in that reference are divided into three categories that are similar to the three categories 
of safety culture in INSAG-4, “Safety Culture”. The categories and their primary traits are as follows: 
Individual commitment to Safety, Management Commitment to Safety, Management Systems. Traits 
are defined as a pattern of thinking, feeling, and behaving such that safety is emphasized over 
competing priorities. Personal and organizational traits described in Ref. [4] are present in a positive 
safety culture and that shortfalls in these traits and attributes contribute significantly to the occurrence 
of the plant incidents.  
In 2005, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission conducted a public meeting on the agency’s initiatives 
to enhance the Reactor Oversight Process to more fully address safety culture. The USNRC staff asked 
stakeholders to provide suggestions/comments on the draft Safety Culture Attributes Table on a 
feedback form located on the Safety Culture web page. Safety Culture Attributes Table is composed of 
four attributes and each of them has several factors such as elementary safety culture, potential safety 
culture inspection information and potential safety culture measure [5].  
Recently Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety developed the safety culture assessment methodology that 
has six indicators and thirty evaluation items [6]. The feature of this methodology utilizes the objective 
data: the number of safety culture self-assessment, the number of staff, the training time etc. The 
results produced by KINS consist of the attributes, the traits, and indicators to evaluate the safety 
culture of the plant organization. In this study, the safety culture indicators are developed and applied 
to the reference plant. The level of and traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture are surveyed and 
safety culture indictors and their definitions are presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Safety culture indicators and definitions 
 
Category 
Safety Culture 
Indicator 
Definition 
Individual 
Commitment to 
Safety 
Human error Prevention of human error 
Communication Efficiency of exchanging information 
Attitude Behaviour toward nuclear safety 
Management 
Commitment to 
Safety 
Highlighting safety 
Operation that keeps safety as the overriding 
priority  
Resource Magnitude of the human resource  
Management System 
Training Degree of training for safe operation 
Procedure 
Propriety of procedure to prevent unexpected 
accident 
Man Machine 
Interface 
Interface level that helps staff to use machines 
easily 
 
Table 2 shows the comparison between the current study of safety culture indicators and those of other 
international studies. There is only one study considered for human error affected by the safety culture. 
Mostly there is no sincere consideration for the man machine interface. However, in this study, they 
are considered and modelled because of the dominant importance in the nuclear safety culture.  
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Table 2: Comparison among safety culture indicators considered  
by various research organizations 
 
Category 
Safety Culture 
Indicator 
INPO IAEA NRC KINS 
Individual 
Commitment to 
Safety 
Human error - - √ - 
Communication √ √ - √ 
Attitude √ √ √ - 
Management 
Commitment to 
Safety 
Highlighting safety √ √ √ √ 
Resource √ √ √ √ 
Management System 
Training √ √ √ √ 
Procedure √ √ √ √ 
Man Machine 
Interface 
- - - - 
 
 
2.2. SCI assessment 
   
The data related to the evaluation of the safety culture indicators and human errors occurring in 
nuclear power plants are obtained from Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety research report. The Korea 
Institute of Nuclear Safety which is a nuclear regulatory agency evaluates the nuclear safety in detail 
through the periodic inspection. They also used to present recommendations to licensee by evaluating 
the causes and the reasons when the reactor stops unexpectedly. The nuclear power plant assessment 
for the current status has been openly published through the website and it contributes to being 
valuable information about the current plant safety.  
The methodology to evaluate the human errors entitled to “A Standard Method for Human Reliability 
Analysis of Nuclear Power Plants” developed in KAERI is now utilized in performing PSA in Korea 
[7]. This methodology explains in detail the performance shaping factor for each human errors. It 
presents their rating criteria. In addition, it gives information that is the relative rating of performance 
shaping factors analysed by the human error experts. The data and the HRA results obtained by the 
periodic inspection are used to develop the quantitative safety culture assessment methodology as 
shown in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3: Safety culture indicator assessment methodology 
 
Safety 
Culture 
Indicator 
Assessment Method Descriptions 
Human error 
 
X : the number of unexpected shutdown caused by 
human error 
Y : the number of unexpected shutdown  
Communicati
on  
X : the number of comments and recommendation 
about “communication” in periodic inspection 
report 
Y : the number of periodic inspection report 
(whole plant)  
Attitude 
 
X : the number of passive shutdown in unexpected 
situation 
Y : the number of unexpected shutdown 
Highlighting 
safety  
X : the number of unexpected shutdown above 
INES level 0  
Y : the number of unexpected shutdown 
Resource 
 
X : the number of staff 
Y : the maximum number of staff 
Training 
 
X : the number of comments and recommendation 
about “training” in periodic inspection report 
Y : the number of periodic inspection report 
(whole plant) 
Z : “training score” from human reliability report 
Procedure 
 
X : the number of comments and recommendation 
about “procedure” in periodic inspection report 
Y : the number of periodic inspection report 
(whole plant) 
Z : “procedure score” from human reliability 
report 
Man 
Machine 
Interface  
X : the number of comments and recommendation 
about “man machine interface” in periodic 
inspection report 
Y : the number of periodic inspection report 
(whole plant) 
Z : “man machine interface score” from human 
reliability report 
 
The data of the variable, “Z” can be obtained from the conversion of the performance shaping factor 
rating to the score. The performance shaping factor has a rating of three steps such as high, middle and 
low. The rating level of “high, middle, and low” cases has been converted to a score “5, 3, 1”, 
respectively. The human error events obtained from the reference of human reliability analysis cited in 
Ref. 7 have been analysed to have each score in which the average value denotes the data “Z”. 
 
2.3. Safety Culture Impact Index model  
 
The core damage frequency which is one of important results of the Probabilistic Safety Assessment is 
used for quantifying the safety culture impact in this study. The CDF which is one of important 
measures is obtained from the accident sequence analysis. The main process to get the CDF is to 
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identify and quantify the minimal cut sets which are composed of a lot of basic events. To achieve this 
process, basic events composing the minimal cut sets are assumed to be independent. However, this 
assumption is not true because there should be the correlation between those basic events. The 
occurrences of two failure events are not independent, for example. They have correlation if they are 
under operation in the same temperature or pressure conditions and environments. In that case, the 
temperature or pressure can be a common factor between two components. Likewise, the concept of 
safety culture can have a common factor between human errors and component failures. That means 
there are correlations between basic events that have the common factor in safety culture elements. 
The common uncertainty source method is utilized to consider these correlation caused by the 
complicated safety culture [8]. The basic event used in this study is a lognormal distribution for the 
uncertainty analysis. This method calculates the minimal cut sets incorporating the correlation 
between the lognormal distributions. It is judged to be appropriate method because it can be applied to 
assessing the impact of the safety culture in nuclear power plants. The formula used in this study is as 
follows.   
 
 
                                (1) 
 
                                       (2) 
                      
                                             (3) 
                       
: Correlation fraction coefficient reflecting the effect of uncertainty source j on  
: Standard deviation of   
: Median value of  
: Lognormal random variable of basic event i   
: Independent impact of   
: Any one of , , … ,  
i: Basic event 
j: Common uncertainty source (j=0: independent effect) 
 
When a random variable, Xi, as shown in Eqn. (1) is assumed to be a lognormal, the probability 
obtained from the minimal cut sets may be changed by the value of correlation fraction coefficient. 
Four common uncertainty sources are defined to apply safety culture impact: system, component, 
failure mode, and department. The vectors for the two basic events among them are: 
 
Basic event 1: (system1, component1, failure mode1, department1) 
Basic event 2: (system2, component2, failure mode2, department2) 
 
If the basic event 1 and 2 lies in the same system, both events might have just one common uncertainty 
source but if their components are also supposed to be same. They will have two common uncertainty 
sources. The number of common uncertainty source in each minimal cut sets are obtained by analysing 
the basic events. The  in the above Eqn. (2) is the degree of common uncertainty source impact on 
the basic event. If the value of  is obtained,  is calculated by Eqn.  (3). All variables of above 
Equations are obtained sequentially. It means that the basic events are independent when the score of 
the safety culture index is 10. For the value of that safety culture index score is 0, it denotes the perfect 
correlation. On the basis of these assumptions, the Equations to find the value of  is expressed as 
follows. 
 
                                          (4) 
 
                              (5) 
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, where the variable, X, is the average of the safety culture index score. 
 
Using the measure of the CDF as shown in the Eqn. (6) below, the Safety Culture Impact Index (SCII) 
is newly defined. 
 
                                    (6) 
 
, where the CDF(SC) means the Core Damage Frequency considering safety culture impact and the  
CDF denotes the Core Damage Frequency not considering safety culture impact. 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
In order to apply the developed SCII model to the reference nuclear power plant, the minimal cut sets 
are produced from by running the SAREX code. For the reference plant, the number of the minimal 
cut sets is a value of 51,212 while the basic events are a value of 1,239. To get a new result of the 
minimal cut sets considering the safety culture impact, the prototype SCII program using the C# 
language has been developed in this study. This program might contribute to summarizing and 
visualizing the safety culture impact for the reference plant. The data shown in Table3 is used and 
Monte Carlo method is applied to quantify the CDF results using the new minimal cut sets. For the 
uncertainty analysis, the SCII value provides both the values corresponding to the confidence levels 
such as 5%, 50%, 95% and the mean value. Figure 1 shows the main screen of the program developed 
in this study. When the input data is obtained properly and applied in this program, the results are 
produced in the format shown in Figure 2 which is one of the output displays. The important ones 
among the outputs include the scores of each safety culture index and the value of SCII. The score of 
safety culture can be also displayed as the histogram graph and the pie chart. It can be used for 
comparing each safety culture index of the reference plant. These graphs show the periodic monitoring 
results and the measures of the SCII changes of the reference plant. The SCII values are also 
represented according to safety culture indicator score shown in Table 4. The safety culture index 
score is correlated to the uncertainty of CDF explained above. It shows that the safety culture affects 
the safety of nuclear power plant quantitatively.    
 
 
Figure 1: Main screen of the program 
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Figure 2: The output screen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: SCII of the reference plant 
      
Safety Culture  
Indicator 
Score  
SCII 
Mean 5% 50% 95% 
0 1.66E+00 7.17E-02 4.81E-01 5.23E+00 
2.5 1.43E+00 1.01E-01 5.46E-01 4.48E+00 
5 1.22E+00 1.31E-01 6.04E-01 3.89E+00 
7.5 1.14E+00 1.95E-01 6.74E-01 3.17E+00 
10 1.00E+00 3.21E-01 7.44E-01 2.31E+00 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
A new methodology for assessing safety culture impact index has been developed and applied for the 
reference nuclear power plant. The SCII may contribute to measuring the changes of the core damage 
frequency which might be affected by the status of safety culture in nuclear power plants. The core 
damage frequency of accident sequences is obtained by the logical combination of minimum cut sets. 
The SAREX code is used for producing safety culture impact index related MCS. The uncertainty in 
safety culture impact has been also analysed.  
The developed SCII model might contribute to comparing the level of safety culture among nuclear 
power plants as well as to improving the safety of nuclear power plants. It is shown that the degree of 
safety culture affecting the core damage frequency can be estimated. The result of uncertainty analysis 
may be increased by considering the safety culture impact. The SCII model therefore might contribute 
to monitoring the level of safety culture and, to improving the safety of nuclear power plants. 
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